Abstract. In the setting of universal composability [Can01] , commitments cannot be implemented without additional assumptions such as that of a publicly available common reference string [CF01]. Here, as an alternative to the commitments in the common reference string model, the use of random oracles to achieve universal composability of commitment protocols is motivated. Special emphasis is put on the security in the situation when the additional "helper functionality" is replaced by a realizable primitive. This contribution gives two constructions which allow to turn a given non-interactive commitment scheme into a noninteractive universally composable commitment scheme in the random oracle model. For both constructions the binding and the hiding property remain valid when collision-free hash functions are used instead of random oracles. Moreover the second construction in this case even preserves the property of perfect binding.
Introduction
The framework [Can01] for multi-party computations allows to formulate the security and, in particular, the composition of multi-party protocols in a very general way. It is possible to treat security notions for rather different multi-party tasks in a common way. For this, protocols are compared to idealized versions of the respective protocol task. If a protocol "behaves" exactly like this idealization with respect to any attacker and in any environment, it is considered a secure realization of the protocol task in question. In the setting of [Can01] an arbitrary environment surrounding the protocol execution is mimicked by an environment machine Z. Furthermore the environment machine Z serves as a distinguisher between a real protocol and the idealized version. A protocol is securely realizing an ideal functionality if no environment Z can distinguish between an execution of the real protocol with a real adversary and a run of the ideal functionality together with a simulator trying to mimic the effect of the real attack. For the purpose of distinguishing the environment machine may choose the inputs for all parties, may see the outputs of all parties, and may interact with the adversary at any time during the protocol. This notion of security, which implies universal composability [Can01] , is very strict and it was shown in [CF01] , that an idealization of a commitment task cannot be securely realized in this sense without additional assumptions. (With additional assumptions, we mean special facilities protocol participants may use and which itself may not be securely realizable; as an example, consider public information ideally chosen from some predefined distribution. See below for details. ) However, in [CF01, DN02, CLOS02] , several protocols for securely realizing an idealization of a commitment functionality are presented; all of them are formulated in the common reference string model, i. e., all of them expect access to public information ideally drawn from some predefined distribution.
The selection of this common reference string is crucial for the security of the commitment protocol. In particular, "imperfect" selections possibly influenced by an adversary may affect the security of the commitment protocol in a very severe way, as will be discussed in Section 3.1. The common reference string in [CF01] serves as a public key to which the corresponding secret key is unknown by assumption. If, in the worst case, the adversary were allowed to choose the common reference string by himself then the binding property as well as the hiding property of a commitment scheme built on this common reference string would be compromised (an analogous statement holds for the constructions in [DN02, CLOS02] ). This is especially dangerous as this security leak cannot be "detected", because the public key is chosen with the appropriate distribution. As a different approach, we consider the use of random oracles for building bit commitment protocols. Of course, like the common reference string, random oracles are not realizable and the property of universal composability is lost when concrete functions replace the random oracle calls. This is in accordance with other results like [CGH98, Nie02, GTK03, BBP03] . These contributions show explicitly that there are protocols which can be proven secure in the random oracle model, yet lose this security completely when instantiating the random oracles. In contrast to that, we show that there is a construction which turns a given bit commitment protocol into a protocol which is universally composable in the random oracle model and which remains binding and hiding when substituting the random oracles with a special class of functions (namely, collision-free hash functions).
As a first solution one might think of using random oracles to derive a common reference string with which universally composable bit commitment can be obtained. But if a random oracle would be replaced by any real hash function no general guarantee for the derived common reference string could be given and all protocols on its basis would be critical. To ensure the common reference string to be chosen at random one could think of deriving it by an interactive protocol which still ensures randomness of the common reference string when random oracles are replaced by real hash functions. But this is not the approach chosen here as this additional interactive protocol reduces the efficiency.
In this contribution we use random oracles in a different way to obtain universal composability which ensures the properties binding and hiding even if the random oracles are replaced by arbitrary collision free hash functions. A random oracle will be used as a function which can be evaluated by every participant of the protocol, but which is not accessible to the environment machine. The equivocability of a bit commitment, which is important for simulatability, can then easily be obtained as in the ideal protocol no random oracle exists and the ideal adversary can determine the outcome of (simulated) evaluations of the random oracle. (Note that in [Nie02] , a similar method was used to obtain non-committing encryption in the random oracle model.)
Furthermore this limitation put up on the environment machine will make it impossible for the environment machine to generate commitments to strings unknown to the attacker thereby preventing attacks where the environment machine uses a corrupted party as a relay to insert such bit commitments into the protocol. Specifically, we give two constructions to convert a bit commitment scheme into a universally composable bit commitment scheme using random oracles. Both constructions yield bit commitments which remain binding and hiding if the random oracle used is replaced by an arbitrary collision free hash function. The first and more simple construction however does not conserve the property of being perfectly binding, whereas the second construction yields a commitment scheme which is perfectly binding if the original commitment scheme was.
Preliminaries

The General Framework
To start, we shortly outline the framework for multi-party protocols defined in [Can01] . First of all, parties (denoted by P 1 through P n ) are modeled as interactive Turing machines (ITMs) (cf. [Can01] ) and are supposed to run some (fixed) protocol π. There also is an adversary (denoted A and modeled as an ITM as well) carrying out attacks on protocol π. Therefore, A may corrupt parties (in which case it learns the party's current state and the contents of all its tapes, and controls its future actions), and intercept or, when assuming unauthenticated message transfer, also fake messages sent between parties. If A corrupts parties only before the actual protocol run of π takes place, A is called non-adaptive, otherwise A is said to be adaptive. The respective local inputs for protocol π are supplied by an environment machine (modeled as an ITM and denoted Z), which may also read all outputs locally made by the parties and communicate with the adversary. Here we will only deal with environments guaranteeing a polynomial (in the security parameter) number of total steps all participating ITMs run. For more discussion on this issue, cf. [HMQS03b] .
The model we have just described is called the real model of computation. In contrast to this, the ideal model of computation is defined just like the real model, with the following exceptions: we have an additional ITM called the ideal functionality F and being able to send messages to and receive messages from the parties privately (i. e., without the adversary being able to even intercept these messages). The ideal functionality may not be corrupted by the adversary, yet may send messages to and receive messages from it. Furthermore, the parties P 1 , . . . , P n are replaced by dummy partiesP 1 , . . . ,P n which simply forward their respective inputs to F and take messages received from F as output. Finally, the adversary in the ideal model is called the simulator and denoted S. The only means of attack the simulator has in the ideal model are those of corrupting parties (which has the same effect as in the real model), delaying or even suppressing messages sent from F to a party, and all actions that are explicitly specified in F. However, S has no access to the contents of the messages sent from F to the dummy parties (except in the case the receiving party is corrupted) nor are there any messages actually sent between (uncorrupted) parties S could intercept. Intuitively, the ideal model of computation (or, more precisely, the ideal functionality F itself) should represent what we ideally expect a protocol to do. In fact, for a number of standard tasks, there are formulations as such ideal functionalities (see, e. g., [Can01] ).
To decide whether or not a given protocol π does what we would ideally expect some ideal functionality F to do, the framework of [Can01] uses a simulatability-based approach: at a time of its choice, Z may enter its halt state and leave output on its output tape. The random variable describing the first bit of Z's output will be denoted by real π,A,Z (k, z) when Z is run on security parameter k ∈ N and initial input z ∈ {0, 1} * (which may, in case of a non-uniform Z, depend on k) in the real model of computation, and ideal F ,S,Z (k, z) when Z is run in the ideal model. Now if for any adversary A in the real model, there exists a simulator S in the ideal model such that for any environment Z and any initial input z, we have that
is a negligible 1 function in k, then protocol π is said to securely realize functionality F.
2 Intuitively, this means that any attack carried out by adversary A in the real model can also be carried out in the idealized modeling with an ideal functionality by the simulator S (hence the name), such that no environment is able to tell the difference. By definition, the trivial protocol which does not generate output realizes any ideal functionality securely. (The corresponding simulator just has to suppress delivery of messages from the ideal functionality to the parties.) To avoid such trivial realizations, we will only consider terminating protocols, which eventually generate output when all protocol messages in the real model are delivered.
To allow for a modular protocol design, in [Can01] also the F-hybrid model of computation (for an arbitrary ideal functionality F) is introduced. Briefly, this model is identical to the real model of computation, but the parties have access to an unbounded number of instances of F, each one identified via a session identifier (SID). The modularity of the hybrid model is legitimated by the fundamental composition theorem of [Can01] . Summarizing, it states that once protocol τ securely realizes functionality F, in any protocol π running in the F-hybrid model, a polynomial number of instances of F can be substituted by invocations of τ without losing security. Specifically, for every real-life adversary A, there is a hybrid-model adversary H such that no environment can tell whether it is interacting with A and π (with F-instances substituted by invocations of τ ) in the real model, or with H and π in the F-hybrid model.
The Common Reference String Model
To catch the notion of information publicly known to all protocol participants, the modeling of [Can01] can be extended to give any participant (including the adversary) access to a common reference string, initially chosen from some distribution D. This can be cast as the F CRS -hybrid model, where F CRS denotes the ideal functionality that in its first activation chooses a value d from a distribution D (the latter over which F CRS is parameterized). From this point on, it replies to any request from a party P i or from the adversary with this value d.
Collision-Free Hash Functions
k is called a family of collision-free hash functions, if the following requirements are met:
-There is a probabilistic algorithm A computing H k in time polynomial in both k and input length. -There is no probabilistic algorithm B being able to find x, y ∈ {0, 1} * sufficing x = y and H k (x) = H k (y) in polynomial time with non-negligible probability.
Using the argument in the proof of [Dam90, Lemma 2.1], one can derive a certain one-way property: for a family of collision-free hash functions H = {H k } as above, there can be no probabilistic algorithm C which, on input y = H k (x) ∈ {0, 1} k for uniformly selected x ∈ {0, 1} k+1 , succeeds with non-negligible probability to find x ∈ {0, 1} k+1 sufficing H(x ) = y in polynomial time.
The Random Oracle Model
The random oracle model (see, e. g., [BR93] ) captures an idealization of a hash function. In particular, the idealized version allows only black-box access and cannot be "predicted" without explicitly evaluating it. Moreover, the function values are uniformly selected random k-bit strings. Using the terminology just described, the random oracle model can be modeled in the setting of [Can01] as the F RO -hybrid model for the ideal functionality F RO given in Figure 1 . In the presence of more than one party, F RO cannot be realized securely without interparty communication. (In this case, its very definition forces any protocol aimed at realizing F RO to behave like an "almost" deterministic function evaluation; yet such a-by construction easily computable and explicitly given-function can Functionality FRO FRO proceeds as follows, running on security parameter k, with parties P1, . . . , Pn and an adversary S.
1. FRO keeps a list L (which is initially empty) of pairs of bitstrings. 2. Upon receiving a value (sid,m) (with m ∈ {0, 1} * ) from some party Pi or from S, do:
-If there is a pair (m,h) for someh ∈ {0, 1} k in the list L, set h :=h. -If there is no such pair, choose uniformly h ∈ {0, 1} k and store the pair
Once h is set, reply to the activating machine (i. e., either Pi or S) with (sid,h). be distinguished easily from F RO , which chooses its return values completely at random in each run.) In particular, one cannot hope to securely realize F RO by, e. g., a family of collision-free hash functions. Below we will investigate possible consequences of such "imperfect" realizations of F RO .
Security Notions for Commitments
First a general remark: for any probabilistic algorithm A we write A(x; r) to indicate execution of A on input x ∈ {0, 1} * and with explicitly supplied random coins r ∈ {0, 1} * . Now a non-interactive string commitment scheme C = {C k , V k }, indexed by a security parameter k ∈ N, is a family of polynomial-time (in both k and input length) algorithms C k and V k , where the C k may be probabilistic. We mandate that C k outputs a tuple (com, dec) of bitstrings com and dec on input m ∈ {0, 1} * , while V k generates output m ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥} on input (com, dec). Furthermore, we require:
* . 2. (Hiding property.) For any m ∈ {0, 1} * , let {com(m)} denote the distribution {com; (com, dec) ← C k (m)}. We require that for arbitrary m 1 , m 2 ∈ {0, 1} * with |m 1 | = |m 2 |, the distributions {com(m 1 )} and {com(m 2 )} are computationally indistinguishable. If any two such distributions are also indistinguishable for computationally unbounded algorithms, we say that the scheme is unconditionally hiding. 3. (Binding property.) There is no probabilistic, polynomial-time (in k) algorithm B which is able to produce with non-negligible probability
If this holds even for computationally unbounded B, then the scheme is said to be unconditionally binding.
It will be convenient to denote by com C k (m) (resp. dec C k (m)) the first (resp., the second) component of C k 's output when run on input m; in particular, com 
Commitment in the Random Oracle Model
Motivation
The common reference string model proved extremely useful for realizing general ideal functionalities: in [CLOS02] , it is shown that almost any two-party ideal functionality F can be realized in the F CRS -hybrid model, under the assumption that trapdoor permutations and augmented two-party non-committing encryption protocols exist. It is also shown there that this result can be extended to the multi-party case when we additionally assume a broadcast channel available (which can also be modeled as an ideal functionality). A key point in the constructions of [CLOS02] is the realization of the commitment functionality F MCOM (see also Appendix A) in the F CRS -hybrid model. Since F MCOM cannot be securely realized as a two-party computation in the real model (see [CF01] ), one must assume some "helper functionality" such as F CRS available. Indeed, in [CF01,DN02,CLOS02], several realizations of different commitment functionalities are described in the common reference string model. Let's shortly recall which additional features the common reference string is to give us, when having in mind securely realizing, e. g., F MCOM (cf. also the discussion in [CLOS02, Section 5]). First, note that at a time one party initiates a commitment in the ideal model, the simulator S must be able to supply the environment Z with a valid commitment without knowing to which value P i is actually committed. Furthermore, in case of a corrupted committer, S must be able to extract the committed bit out of a valid commitment. Since alone choosing the common reference string must enable the simulator do to so, the whole security of a commitment protocol formulated in the common reference string model relies on the fact that F CRS chooses the common reference string ideally and in a trusted manner.
Moreover, once we assume "imperfect" implementations of the ideal functionality F CRS (i. e., publicly available random strings whose choice may somehow be influenced by an adversary), any protocol which realizes F MCOM in the F CRShybrid model may get insecure in a fatal way: in the extreme case in which an adversary may freely choose the common reference string, it can generate "fake" commitments which it can later open as 0 or 1, as well as "look into" legitimately generated commitments at wish. Specifically, such imperfect common reference strings can damage the security of the general constructions in [CLOS02] in a serious way. That is, a protocol which is to realize some ideal functionality F using commitments loses not only its universal composability property, but also may lose security in a very "intuitive" way, since the underlying commitment scheme does so.
One way to avoid this is to use another "helper functionality". In this contribution we will present two constructions in the F RO -hybrid model where a random oracle F RO is available. The constructions of this work allow to turn a given non-interactive string commitment scheme into a non-interactive string commitment scheme in the F RO -hybrid model which is universally composable. Moreover the constructions ensure the hiding and binding proprties even when the random oracles are replaced by arbitrary collision free hash functions. The second construction even preserves the property of perfect binding. In fact, when implementing the ideal commitment functionality via a hiding and unconditionally binding commitment scheme, the construction in [CLOS02] (formulated in the framework of [Can01] ) for realizing general ideal functionalities is essentially the one presented in [GMW87, Gol02] in the special case of a secure function evaluation.
A Universally Composable Commitment Scheme
First, let's have a look at the abovementioned functionality F SCOM , which is derived from the functionality F MCOM of [CLOS02] (the latter which is also given in Appendix A). A description of F SCOM is given in Figure 2 . The commitment phase described is different than that of F MCOM . This is to take into account the following attack, which is described for the case of key exchange in [HMQS03a] , and goes back to an argument of Damgård for the case of bit commitment. For this attack, one party P i is invoked with input b by the environment. Then, before any messages are delivered, the environment instructs the adversary to corrupt P i and to let it perform the protocol from the start, but using input b = b. In the ideal model, P i 's input b is already forwarded to F MCOM and can not be changed anymore, although P i gets corrupted later on. On the other hand, in the real model, the bit committed to will be b = b, as P i is "reset" when corrupted and no messages were delivered before. This allows for a "trivial" distinction of real and ideal model for any protocol aimed at realizing F MCOM ; we solved this situation by a modified functionality F SCOM which lets the adversary decide on the point in time when a commit input is accepted. An alternative to our formulation would be to change the framework to let the adversary also delay messages sent from parties to the ideal functionality. This approach was taken in [CLOS02, revision dated July 14th].
Notice that different commitments are handled via different subsession identifiers, each one of them handling at most one commitment per committer-receiver pair. Furthermore, F SCOM allows committing to a string of bits rather than only to a single bit. It is worthwhile to point out that no information (not even length information) about the string m committed to is given to the adversary. Now assume that C = {C k , V k } is a non-interactive string commitment scheme as described in Section 2.5. Consider protocol hc C given in Figure 3 . This protocol is formulated in the F RO -hybrid model and aimed at realizing the ideal functionality F SCOM . Proposition 1. Assuming authenticated links, protocol hc C securely realizes F SCOM with respect to adaptive adversaries as soon as C = {C k , V k } is a noninteractive string commitment scheme. Proof. For any adversary H mounting attacks on protocol hc C in the F ROhybrid model, we describe a simulator S = S H emulating such attacks in the ideal model. S internally keeps a complete simulation of a run of H in the F ROhybrid model. That is, S keeps a simulation of parties P 1. When receiving a message (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m) from Pi, where m ∈ {0, 1} * , first send the message (request,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj) to the adversary S and, if S then issues a corresponding ready message (see below), proceed to the third step. 2. When receiving (ready,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj, ) from the adversary, and at least messages (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m) (possibly with different m's) have been received from Pi, perform the third step described below with the message m contained in the th of these messages. 3. Record the tuple (ssid, Pi, Pj, m) and send (receipt,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj) to Pj. Ignore any future commit messages with the same ssid from Pi to Pj. -Reveal Phase: Upon receiving a message (reveal,sid,ssid,Pj) from Pi:
If a tuple (ssid, Pi, Pj, m) was previously recorded, then send the message (reveal,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m) to Pj and S. Otherwise, ignore.
Fig. 2. Functionality FSCOM
Protocol hcC
These are instructions for parties P1 through Pn to carry out commitments. The parties expect to be run in the FRO-hybrid model. For ease of notation, here O sid (x) denotes the reply of the FRO-instance with session ID sid to the query x.
-When activated with input (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m), where m ∈ {0, 1} * , Pi computes (com1, dec1) ← C k (O sid (ssid, i, j, m, r1); r2) for a uniformly chosen k-bit string r1. Note that by r2 ∈ {0, 1} * , we denote the random coins used by C k during this process. Then, Pi computes (com2, dec2) ← C k (O sid (r2)) and sends the message (sid,ssid,com1,com2) to Pj while storing (ssid, j, m, r1, r2, dec2). Further (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,·) inputs are ignored.
-When receiving (sid, ssid, com1, com2) from Pi, where com1, com2 ∈ {0, 1} * and ssid is a subsession ID under which Pj did not yet get such a message from any party, Pj stores the pair (ssid, i, com1, com2) and locally outputs (receipt,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj). Any future messages (sid, ssid, com 1 , com 2 ) with the same subsession ID ssid from Pi are ignored.
-When activated on input (reveal,sid,ssid,Pj), party Pi checks if it has a tuple (ssid, j, m, r1, dec2) (for any m, r1, dec2) stored. If so, Pi sends the tuple (sid, ssid, m, r1, r2, dec2) to Pj. Further inputs (reveal,sid,ssid,Pj) are ignored. -When receiving (sid, ssid, m, r1, r2, dec2) with m, dec2, r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1} * from Pi while already having received a value (sid, ssid, com1, com2) also from Pi, Pj first computes o2 ← V k (com2, dec2). Then, if o2 = O sid (r2), Pj checks if com C k (O sid (ssid, i, j, m, r1); r2) equals com1. If so, Pj locally outputs (reveal,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m) and ignores all further (sid, ssid, . . .) messages. In any other case, Pj does nothing. protocol hc C , a simulation of H interacting with these parties, and (as needed) simulated instances of the ideal functionality F RO . Communication of H with the environment is forwarded to the (non-simulated) environment Z with which S is to interact. Similarly, messages from Z to S are forwarded to the adversary H in the simulation.
Of course, S still needs to keep its simulation consistent with all inputs the dummy parties receive from Z; similarly, the output behaviour of the dummy parties has to be the same as that of the simulated parties. (Note that generally, S has no information about inputs and only existence information about outputs of the dummy parties, unless the ideal functionality explicitly informs S about incoming input, or about output sent to the parties.) Therefore, S acts as follows:
-When the simulated H corrupts a simulated party P (s) i , S first corrupts the corresponding dummy party P i and modifies P (s) i 's state to account for ignored inputs possibly handed from Z to P i . (Upon corruption of P i , S gets to know about such messages when receiving the state of P i .) -Upon receiving (receipt,sid,ssid,P i ,P j ) from F SCOM (in which case P i and thus P (s) i must be uncorrupted), S picks s ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly and computes com 1 ← com C k (s; r 2 ) and com 2 ← com C k (O sid (r 2 ); r 3 ) for a uniformly chosen r 3 (here the simulated random oracle F RO is queried). Then, S simulates a message (sid, ssid, com 1 , com 2 ) from P (s) i to P (s) j and stores this message together with r 2 , r 3 , and s.
-When H delivers a message (sid, ssid, com 1 , com 2 ) from P did not yet get such a message with subsession ID ssid from P i , S proceeds as follows: if P (s) i (and hence P i as well) is uncorrupted, S sends (ready,sid,ssid,P i ,P j ,1) to F SCOM , and delivers the receipt message then sent from F SCOM to P j as soon as P (s) j outputs such a receipt message (i. e., immediately afterwards). If, on the other hand, P (s) i (and thus P i ) is corrupted, then first the message m committed to may have to be extracted from com 1 and com 2 which could have been supplied by Z without appropriate commit input. By looking up all queries to the simulated F RO -instance with session ID sid, we can reduce to a polynomial number of possible m-r 1 -r 2 -combinations. Hence by verifying whether com 1 equals com C k (O sid (ssid, i, j, m, r 1 ); r 2 ), S can extract m alone from com 1 , provided that the commitment can be unveiled according to hc and F RO did never output the same value twice. (Note that here we use the binding property of C.) In these latter cases, it suffices to set m to 0 (or any other value), since F RO produces collisions only in a negligible fraction of runs and commitments generated without explicitly querying the random oracle can be unveiled only with negligible probability. (Here it is important that since the subsession identifier sid and the party identities i and j are hashed together with m, hash values cannot be "re-used" in a different subsession.) Once m is determined, S sends (commit,sid,ssid,P i ,P j ,m) in the name of the corrupted relay P i to functionality F SCOM , followed by a corresponding (ready,sid,ssid,P i ,P j , ) signal. Here denotes the number of already received request notifications plus 1, and thus indicates that the message m just sent is to be committed to. This causes the ideal functionality to send a receipt message to P j , which then can be delivered by S as soon as P (s) j generates output in the simulation.
-Upon receiving (reveal,sid,ssid,P i ,P j ,m) from F SCOM (which means that P i is still uncorrupted), S lets P (s) i compute a commitment to m at P j (under session ID sid and subsession ID ssid), but forces
• the simulated F RO with session ID sid to output s when queried by P to use the values r 2 and r 3 which S stored together with the message (sid, ssid, j, com 1 , com 2 ). Now S dismisses the actual commitment message sent from P (s) i to P (s) j (note that by construction, this message is exactly the message simulated by S) and modifies P (s) i 's internal state so as to look as if this commitment had been performed exactly at the time the corresponding message (sid, ssid, com 1 , com 2 ) was simulated from P
Finally, P i is fed with input (reveal,sid,ssid,P i ,P j ,m) to reflect in the simulation the actual decommitment operation S was informed about. The reveal message sent from F SCOM to P j is delivered as soon as P generates reveal output while uncorrupted, the corresponding dummy party P j has to generate output as well. The steps above take care that this output is the same in the ideal model as in the simulation, except in a negligible fraction of runs. Particularly, S only needs to deliver the corresponding reveal message from F SCOM to P j when the corresponding committer P i was uncorrupted at the time it got its reveal input. If, on the other hand, P i was corrupted at that time, S must first supply F SCOM with the corresponding reveal input via the corrupted relay P i . In this case, S has already extracted the message m needed for this reveal input either from P i 's state (when P i 's corruption took place after the delivery of the commitment), or, otherwise, from the actual commitment message delivered to P (s) j . (Here we use that except with negligible probability, there is no efficient way to unveil a commitment in more than one way; by construction of protocol hc C , this follows from the "collision-freeness" of F RO .) By construction, S provides Z with a view identical to one of a run in the hybrid model, until a reveal output of a party P j differs from that of the respective simulated party P (s) j . However, this can only happen when S is unable to extract a message out of a commitment sent from a corrupted committer P (s) i to an uncorrupted receiver P (s) j , or when S cannot unveil a commitment generated by S itself. As reasoned above, the probability for any of these is only negligible, henceforth we are done. Note that we did not use the hiding property of C.
For achieving universal composability, we had to incorporate subsession identifiers and the identities of committer and receiver into the message actually committed to. To allow for statements independent of such protocol-inherent information, we drop that requirement on the format of the message and, to be able to formally view the protocol hc C as a non-interactive string commitment scheme, we set hc r 2 ); r 3 ) ) for uniformly chosen r 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and random coins r 2 , r 3 ∈ {0, 1} * , then dec ← (m, r 1 , r 2 , dec C k (O(r 2 ); r 3 )) and returns (com, dec). On input (com, dec) of the form com = (com 1 , com 2 ) and dec = (m, r 1 , r 2 , dec 2 ), algorithm V k computes o 2 ← V k (com 2 , dec 2 ) and, if o 2 = O(r 2 ), checks whether com 1 equals C k (O(m, r 1 ); r 2 ). Only in this case V k returns m, otherwise it returns ⊥.
As mentioned above, we would like to be able to deduce security properties of the scheme hc C even when having substituted all random oracles O by suitable hash functions. Let therefore hc C,H denote the scheme which is identical to hc C , except that all O-queries are replaced by evaluations of H k , where H = {H k } is a family of collision-free hash functions as defined in the preliminaries. Proposition 2. Once H = {H k } is a family of collision-free hash functions and C = {C k , V k } is a non-interactive string commitment scheme, the scheme hc C,H = {C k , V k } (as described above) is also a non-interactive string commitment scheme. Furthermore, if C is unconditionally hiding, then so is hc C,H .
Proof. Meaningfulness, binding and hiding properties of hc = hc C,H need to be checked. The meaningfulness of hc follows directly from that of C. Furthermore, every algorithm B which supplies a hc-commitment together with two decommitments yielding different messages has to supply in particular a Ccommitment together with two C-decommitments yielding messages H k (m, r 1 ), resp. H k (m , r 1 ). If both are equal, B has found a H k -collision (since m = m by assumption); if the hash values are different, then B breaks the binding property of C. In either case, we have shown the binding property of hc. Now for the hiding property, consider the scheme hc = {C k , V k }, which is identical to hc, except that the C-commitment to H k (r 2 ) (where r 2 denotes the random coins used in the C-commitment to H k (m, r 1 )) is replaced by a C-
Let A be a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm which breaks the computational hiding property of hc. More specifically, say that there are messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ {0, 1} * , such that the difference
is a non-negligible function in k. Assume first that
is non-negligible in k as well. Since by construction, a C-commitment to a message H k (m, r 1 ) can be extended to an hc -commitment to the message m without knowledge of m or r 1 , it follows that from A, we can build a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A 1 with
non-negligible in k for a certain, fixed r 1 ∈ {0, 1} k . Such an A 1 would break the hiding property of C, thereby yielding a contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose that Adv(A, hc , m 1 , m 2 ) is negligible in k. As then,
is non-negligible, at least one of the addends on the right-hand side of the equation must be as well. So say that P(A(com hc
is non-negligible (with fixed i ∈ {1, 2}). Then there have to be certain, fixed r 1 , r 2 for which A can distinguish tuples (com
Hence from A we can construct a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A 2 with
non-negligible in k, thereby breaking the hiding property of C. So in either case, we have a contradiction and there can be no such algorithm A; consequently, hc must be computationally hiding. As this reduction also applies to computationally unbounded algorithms A, a possible unconditional hiding property of C is preserved.
Preserving Unconditional Binding
Although we have shown that the construction hc C,H preserves hiding and computational binding properties of C, this is not true for a potential unconditional binding property: Any algorithm breaking the collision-freeness of H can be used to generate hc-commitments together with multiple decommitments to different messages. (Note that with hc, we are actually committed only to the hash value of a message.) An unconditionally binding string commitment scheme cannot completely hide the length of the message committed to; to reflect this in an idealization, we define the ideal functionality F BSCOM to be identical to F SCOM (cf. Figure 2) , except that F BSCOM supplies the simulator S upon a commitment to a message m with the bit length |m| of this message. This length information is included in the respective request message sent to the simulator.
Let F H be the following probabilistic, polynomial-time (in both the security parameter k and its input length) algorithm, where H = {H k } k is a family of functions H k : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k which in turn are computable in polynomial time. Upon input m = m 1 · · · m n ∈ {0, 1} n , F H uniformly selects s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ {0, 1} k with each s i satisfying s i H k (s i ) = H k (s i )s i and outputs
where π(0, s, t) = (s, t) and π(1, s, t) = (t, s) for arbitrary s, t ∈ {0, 1} * . Algorithm F H will be used to encode a message in a (for the simulator) equivocable yet (for parties) binding way. To extract the encoded message, we will use the following polynomial-time computable function F −1 H . We set
In all other cases, we set F
Given a non-interactive string commitment scheme C, consider a protocol bhc C , whose "infrastructure" is identical to that of protocol hc C , but the commitment and decommitment messages differ slightly, as does the verification procedure. Protocol bhc C is described in Figure 4 . Proposition 3. Assuming authenticated links, protocol bhc C securely realizes F BSCOM with respect to adaptive adversaries as soon as C = {C k , V k } is a noninteractive string commitment scheme.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 1, and we will only describe the necessary modifications to the simulator S. For generating an equivocable commitment to a message of length (here we use the length information with which F BSCOM supplies S upon commitment requests), S picks s ∈ {0, 1} k , f ∈ {0, 1} 2 k , then generates C-commitments C k (s, f ; r 2 ) and C k (O sid (r 2 )) and with these simulates a commitment as before. Later, when being forced to unveil this commitment as a commitment to m ∈ {0, 1} , S lets the simulated committer P i 's random tape, resp. the random tape of F RO -the simulated F RO to output s when queried by P (s) i on (ssid, i, j, f ).
Again, this "tampering" with F RO is possible only if F RO was not queried on any of these values before. By the hiding property of C and the randomization Protocol bhcC These are instructions for parties P1 through Pn to carry out commitments in the FRO-hybrid model.
-When activated with input (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m), where m ∈ {0, 1} * , Pi computes f ← FO sid (m) and (com1, dec1) ← C k (O sid (ssid, i, j, f ), f ; r2) . Then, Pi computes (com2, dec2) ← C k (O sid (r2)) and sends the message (sid,ssid,com1,com2) to Pj while storing (ssid, j, f, r2, dec2). Any further (commit,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,·) inputs are ignored.
-When receiving (sid, ssid, com1, com2) from Pi, where com1, com2 ∈ {0, 1} * and ssid is a subsession ID under which Pj did not yet get such a message from any party, Pj stores the pair (ssid, i, com1, com2) and locally outputs (receipt,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj). Any future messages (sid, ssid, com 1 , com 2 ) from Pi (with the same sid and ssid) are ignored.
-When activated on input (reveal,sid,ssid,Pj), Pi checks if it has stored a tuple (ssid, j, f, r2, dec2) (for any f, dec2). If so, Pi sends (sid, ssid, f, dec2) to Pj. Any future inputs (reveal,sid,ssid,Pj) are ignored. -When receiving (sid, ssid, f, r2, dec2) with f, r2, dec2 ∈ {0, 1} * from Pi while already having received a value (sid, ssid, com1, com2) also from Pi, party
If so, Pj locally outputs (reveal,sid,ssid,Pi,Pj,m) and ignores further (sid, ssid, . . .) messages. In any other case, Pj does nothing. The extraction of the message committed to from a commitment that was generated according to bhc C is straightforward; again, if a commitment was not generated as specified by bhc C , it can only be unveiled with negligible probability. With these changes, the proof of Proposition 1 applies.
Once again, by dropping protocol-inherent information, protocol bhc C may formally be regarded as a non-interactive commitment scheme. Therefore, we set bhc C = {C k , V k }, where algorithm C k computes f ← F O (m), then com ← (com C k (O(f ), f ; r 2 ), com C k (O(r 2 ); r 3 )) and dec ← (f, r 2 , dec C k (O(r 2 ); r 3 )) for random coins r 2 , r 3 ∈ {0, 1} * , and finally returns (com, dec). On input (com, dec) of the form com = (com 1 , com 2 ) and dec = (f, r 2 , dec 2 ), algorithm V k computes o 2 ← V k (com 2 , dec 2 ) and, if o 2 = O(r 2 ), checks whether com 1 equals C k (O(f ), f ; r 2 )). Only in this case V k returns F −1 O (f ), otherwise it returns ⊥. As will be shown, bhc C preserves not only hiding properties of C, but also a possible unconditional binding property, albeit for the price of being less efficient than hc C and leaking information about the length |m| of the message being committed to. Proposition 4. Once H = {H k } is a family of collision-free hash functions for which F H is efficiently computable and C = {C k , V k } is a non-interactive string commitment scheme, the scheme bhc C,H = {C k , V k } (as described above) is also a non-interactive string commitment scheme. If C is unconditionally hiding, then so is bhc C,H . If C is unconditionally binding, then so is bhc C,H .
Proof. The meaningfulness of bhc C,H = bhc follows from that of C. The computational binding property of bhc follows as in the proof of Proposition 2; furthermore, as F −1 H (F H (m)) = m for any H, m, the same argument shows that bhc is unconditionally binding if C is. Also for the hiding properties of bhc, the argument of the proof of Proposition 2 applies when we set bhc = {C k , V k }. When being run on input m, algorithm C k computes the tuple (com , dec ) with com ← (com C k (H k (f ), f ; r 2 ), com C k (0 k ; r 3 )) and dec ← (f, r 2 ) for f ← F H (m). The definition of V k is obvious.
Conclusions
In the model of [Can01] bit commitment cannot be securely realized without additional assumptions, e. g. the availability of an additional functionality like a common reference string or, as proposed in this work, a random oracle. As a motivation for the use of random oracles we discussed difficulties which may arise when a common reference string functionality is replaced by a cryptographic primitive which is realizable from scratch. This contribution gave two constructions which allow to turn a given noninteractive bit commitment into a universally composable commitment scheme in the random oracle model. The resulting commitment schemes remain binding and hiding even if the random oracles are replaced by collision resistant hash functions. The second construction even preserves the property of perfect binding.
One referee pointed out that a separation of the random oracle model and the CRS model is a consequence of our result. Namely, [DG03] showed that from the existence of a universally composable bit commitment in a CRS model, a secure key exchange protocol can be derived. However, in the random oracle model, we proved that a binding and concealing bit commitment can be transformed into a universally composable one. So if a random oracle could be implemented using a common reference string (drawn from a suitable distribution), the existence of a binding and concealing bit commitment alone would imply a secure key exchange protocol. (In fact, it seems that a universally composable bit commitment can be implemented in the random oracle model without any further assumptions, thus yielding a stronger separation.) On the other hand, implementing a common reference string in the random oracle model can be-depending on the distribution of the reference string-non-trivial.
It is an interesting open question how the constructions given here affect the non-malleability of a given commitment scheme. To the best of our knowledge it is not clear how relations among committed values behave with respect to the use of hash functions in the given constructions.
